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PROCEDURE
CRIMINAL TRIAL PROCEDURE
Francis C. Sullivan*
SPEEDY TRIAL
In State v. Devito' the defendant raised his incarceration in a
New Jersey prison asba bar to a prosecution for armed robbery in
Louisiana, basing his claim of prescription on article 578 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure.2 The prosecution was instituted by a bill of
information on February 16, 1977, and trial was not commenced until
after the expiration of the statutory two year period. This time
lapse set the stage for a mandatory dismissal of the prosecution
unless some interruption of prescription could be established under
article 579 of the Code.' Although the prosecution clearly knew of
the defendant's whereabouts even prior to filing the charges, the
argument was made that prescription was interrupted because the
defendant's presence for the trial could not be obtained for reasons
beyond the control of the state. The state alleged that the accused
would not waive extradition and that the state made a good faith
but ineffective effort to extradite him. In the original opinion
Justice Blanche speaking for the majority, with three dissenters,'
pointed out that prior jurisprudence5 was inconsistent, and found
that since the state failed to establish a valid and continuing inter-
ruption under article 579 the absolute bar of article 578 must
operate to dismiss the prosecution.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 391 So. 2d 813 (La. 1980).
2. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 578 provides in part: "IN]o trial shall be commenced:...
(2) In other felony cases after two years from the date of institution of the prosecution;...."
3. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 579 provides:
The period of limitation established by Article 578 shall be interrupted if:
(1) The defendant at any time, with the purpose to avoid detection, apprehen-
sion, or prosecution, flees from the state, is outside the state, or is absent from
his usual place of abode within the state: or
(2) The defendant cannot be tried because of insanity or because his presence
for trial cannot be obtained by legal process, or for any other cause beyond the
control of the state.
The periods of limitation established by Article 578 shall commence to run
anew from the date the cause of interruption no longer exists.
4. Chief Justice Dixon, and Justices Marcus and Lemmon dissented.
5. State v. Dupree, 256 La. 146, 235 So. 2d 408 (1970); State v. Shushan, 206 La.
415, 10 So. 2d 185 (1944). Dupree was "expressly disapproved" on rehearing. 391 So. 2d
813, 816 (La. 1980).
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On rehearing, the same result was reached with the Justices
maintaining their original voting positions. Justice Dennis, now
speaking for the majority, emphasized the importance of the Uni-
form Extradition Act adopted by Louisiana' as well as New Jersey
and some forty-six other states in implementation of the federal con-
stitutional authority.7 When the state learns of the presence of the
accused in another state the means of obtaining his presence for
trial is clearly available though extradition. The prosecution has a
heavy burden of showing that it is excused from the clear require-
ments of article 578 to bring charges within the mandated period
In Devito the court found that the state had failed to carry this
burden; apparently, the case in which this' burden could be met
would be extremely rare indeed, given such knowledge. Considered
in this light, the refusal of the accused to waive extradition had no
effect except to force the prosecution to utilize legal remedies
available. The refusal of the accused certainly can not excuse a
refusal or inability by the state to extradite within the period pro-
vided by article 578.
The dissenters focused on the first clause of article 579 rather
than the second,9 but from different points of view. The Chief
Justice and Justice Marcus would interrupt prescription against pro-
secution at any time when a defendant flees and is out of the state.
This approach appears to be a very simple rule, easy to apply, but
what of the language in article 579(1) "with the purpose to avoid
detection, apprehension or prosecution"?' Unless we are to be faced
with yet another dubious presumption, the proof of the purpose for
clause-one acts simply adds another heavy burden to the prosecution
and a poor factual substitute for extradition. Justice Lemmon looked
at the fact of the refusal to waive extradition as proof of clause-one
grounds of remaining out of the state for the purpose of avoiding
prosecution thereby interrupting prescription. The difficulty with
this approach is that it tends to ignore the importance of the rights
afforded an accused in the extradition process and to expand unduly
the scope of article 579(1) to situations involving the exercise of
valid legal rights.
In short, where the prosecution can obtain the presence of an ac-
cused for trial through extradition within the period prescribed in
article 578 it must do so or dismiss the case.
6. LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 261-80.
7. U.S. CONST. art IV, § 2.
8. State v. Driever, 347 So. 2d 1132 (La. 1977).
9. 391 So. 2d at 815.
10. See text of article 579 cited in note 3, supra.
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RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The basic doctrines of right to counsel are now hornbook law.
The right to counsel is a fundamental right essential to a fair trial."
No accused may be imprisoned for any offense of any category
unless the person is represented by counsel or knowingly and intel-
ligently waives this right.' A number of cases have considered the
validity of waivers of counsel, 3 but rarely has the question of the
determination of indigency been presented for review. The supreme
court had the opportunity to speak to this point in State v. La
Fleur" where the defendant's financial ability to employ counsel was
never evaluated properly by the trial judge who accepted a waiver
of counsel in a perjury case. On March 25th the defendant was ar-
raigned for petty theft and asked the court to appoint counsel. The
judge refused to do so on the basis that the accused had been
employed until his arrest and had raised $150.00 for bail. 5 On April
1 the defendant pleaded guilty to this charge and made the
statements that led to the present perjury charge. On April 8 the
defendant was charged with perjury, waived counsel and pleaded
guilty. In the perjury proceeding the defendant did not request
counsel, and the judge made no comment. Under the circumstances
the supreme court said there simply was no free and voluntary
waiver of counsel. Further, the court refused to apply the rule allow-
ing an implied waiver of counel where the defendant clearly is able
to obtain counsel yet persists in demanding court-appointed counsel,
because it could not find the clear evidence that defendant could af-
ford an attorney. The statute which sets forth the procedure for
determining indigency'" provides specifically that release on bail
11. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963).
12. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
13. See State v. Bell, 381 So. 2d 393 (La. 1980); Sullivan, Developments in the
Law, 1979-1980-Criminal Trial Procedure, 41 LA. L. REV. 582, 584 (1981).
14. 391 So. 2d 445 (La. 1980).
15. On learning that the accused had been earning $8.00 an hour with a construc-
tion company, the judge observed: "There's no reason why the Court should appoint an
attorney for you. I don't suppose these lawyers clear eight dollars an hour." Id. at 448.
16. LA. R.S. 15:147 (1950) states:
A. The determination of indigency of any accused person shall be made by the
court at any stage of the proceedings. The chief indigent defender or his
assistants, or a member of the indigent defender panel appointed by the board or
the court for such purpose, shall be allowed to summon witnesses to testify before
the court concerning the financial ability of any accused person to employ counsel
for his defense.
In determining whether or not a person is indigent and entitled to the appoint-
ment of counsel, the court shall consider:
a) Whether the person is a needy person and the extent of his ability to pay,
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alone shall not disqualify one for appointment of counsel, although
this is one matter of dispute among many members of the general
public. The tone of this decision indicates that trial judges should
make a full and fair examination of the accused on the record in
determining his need for appointed counsel, and when in doubt
should appoint counsel since partial reimbursement may be ordered
should the defendant later appear to have financial resources."7 In
general, it seems to this author that the time has come to require
financial participation by all defendants in the costs of their
defense-and to enforce the obligation. By making periodic pay-
ments a condition of probation and parole a greater degree of
respect for the right to counsel might be obtained.
RECUSATION OF JUDGES
The motion to recuse a trial judge is often the result of long
trials, personal feelings or other unfortunate circumstances. Its pur-
pose is clear-to assure that the judge is not biased, prejudiced, or
personally interested in a particular case so as to be fair and impar-
tial-and the grounds are set out in article 671 of the Code.'8 The
basis for the disqualification must be factual, specific and substantial
and must appear on the face of the motion.'9 In State v. Baldwin'
the supreme court refused to sanction the use of the motion as a
device to evoke immediate review of trial conduct of one trial judge
by another trial judge. Calling this procedure an undue burden on
trial courts the supreme court stated that all such matter related to
the presentation of the evidence appears on the record and can be
reviewed adequately on appeal. The court also pointed out that com-
plaints relating to how the trial judge conducts the proceedings can
the court shall consider such factors as income, property owned, outstanding
obligations, number and ages of dependents;
b) Release on bail alone shall not disqualify a person for appointment of
counsel. In each case, the person subject to the penalty of perjury shall certify in
writing such material factors relating to his ability to pay as the court prescribes.
17. LA. R.S. 15:148 (1950) states:
A. To the extent that a person is financially able to provide for an attorney,
other necessary services and facilities of representation and court costs, the court
shall order him to pay for these items. The court may order payment in in-
stallments, or in any manner which it believes reasonable and compatible with the
defendant's financial ability.
B. Payments so made shall be transmitted to and become a part of the in-
digent defender fund of the district in which the person is prosecuted.
18. LA. CODE CmM. P. art. 671.
19. State v. Gordy, 380 So. 2d 1347 (La. 1980). The procedure for recusation of
trial judges is covered in Code of Criminal Procedure article 674.
20. 388 So. 2d 679 (La. 1980).
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be raised by a motion for mistrial.' This result is not subject to
criticism except in the situation where the conduct of the judge at
trial for the first time discloses the actual existence of a ground for
recusation." In such a case the legislature clearly intended the
recusation procedure to operate."
The court through Justice Lemmon chose to add some dicta con-
cerning the duty of trial judges:
While trial courts have a duty to remain impartial and neutral,
judges are not merely umpires or moderators. They also have a
duty to apply the law and assist in the search for truth .... As
Judge Hand said . .. : "A judge is more than a moderator; he is
charged to see that the law is properly administered, and it is a
duty which he can not discharged by remaining inert."'"
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this view of the role of the
judge is the absence of Louisiana citation and the use of two federal
citations."
PREJUDICIAL PUBLICITY
Perhaps as a result of increased public interest in crime and law
enforcement and the consequent expanded media coverage of such
matters, claims are 'frequently made that for the accused to receive
a fair and impartial trial in the parish where the prosecution is
pending is impossible. The primary corrective for such prejudice is
the change of venue to a non-affected parish," but to obtain the
desired change the defendant has the burden of showing that be-
cause of the existence of the prejudice in the collective mind of the
community a fair and impartial trial cannot be obtained.' As is usual
with this type of decision by a trial judge, it is a matter for the
sound discretion of the judge and the decision will not be reversed
on appeal, absent a clear showing of abuse of this discretion.16 As an
aid in determining whether to grant a motion for change of venue
the supreme court in 1975 in the leading case of State v. Bell2 set
out seven factors to be considered: (1) the nature of the pretrial pub-
21. LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 772 & 775.
22. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art 674.
23. Id., comment (b).
24. 388 So. 2d 679, 686 (La. 1980).
25. Knapp v. Kinsey, 232 F.2d 458 (6th Cir. 1965): United States v. Marzano, 149
F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1945).
26. LA. CODE CalM. P. arts. 621-27.
27. State v. Sonnier, 379 So. 2d 1336 (La. 1980): LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 622.
28. See State v. Sheppard, 350 So. 2d 615 (La. 1977).
29. 315 So. 2d 307, 311 (La. 1975).
1982]
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licity and the degree to which it has circulated in the community; (2)
the connection of government officials with the release of the pub-
licity; (3) the length of time between dissemination of the publicity and
trial; (4) the severity and notoriety of the offense; (5) the area from
which the jury is to be drawn; (6) other events occurring in the com-
munity Which either affect or reflect the attitude of the community
or individual jurors toward the defendant; and (7) any factors likely
to affect the candor and veracity of the prospective jurors on voir
dire.
In State v. Adams"0 the court pointed out that it had previously
authorized the "dry run voir dire"'" as a proper method of inquiring
into the questions of community prejudice and pretrial publicity."2 In
this process potential jurors are called and examined as on voir dire
to determine the nature and extent of the publicity and the attitude
of the community towards the accused. If the trial judge is uncon-
vinced as a result of the questioning and denies the motion, the ac-
tual selection of trial jurors then begins. Chief Justice Dixon in a
brief concurrence in which Justice Blanche joined, stated that he did
"not agree that this court approved 'dry run voir dire' in change of
venue hearings,"33 but despite this, the dry run seemingly is the
most effective tool available to the trial judge in his efforts to deter-
mine the community reaction to media reports. This question is
most difficult to determine and is without other readily available
means of proof. Other than the time necessary to conduct the hear-
ing, few real objections probably may be made, and the time is well
spent on such pretrial efforts.
DISCOVERY SANCTIONS
The Louisiana Supreme Court was presented with two signifi-
cant opportunities this term to examine the application of the sanc-
tion provisions of Louisiana criminal discovery practice. In State v.
Statum3' the defendant filed a pretrial motion for discovery and in-
spection3" of photographs and tangible objects to be used at trial.
The state filed an answer on a standard form indicating that it had
none. Additionally, the defendant was authorized by the state to in-
spect all photos and objects at the sheriff's office. At trial, photos
were offered by the prosecution and admitted, no defense objection
30. 394 So. 2d 1204 (La. 1981).
31. Referred to as the "try me" voir dire by Justice Lemmon speaking for the
court in State v. Baldwin, 388 So. 2d 679, 682 n.2 (La. 1980).
32. State v. Bell, 394 So. 2d 1204, 1208 (La. 1981).
33. 394 So. 2d at 1214 (Dixon, C.J., dissenting).
34. 390 So. 2d 886 (La. 1980).
35. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art 718.
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being made based on the state's failure to disclose the photographs
in answer to the discovery motion. The state also offered the knife
retrieved from the defendant's vehicle. Here the defendant properly
objected to the failure to disclose. The trial judge excluded the knife
and ruled that no further reference was to be made to the knife dur-
ing the trial. Article 729.5 makes available a full range of sanctions
to enable the discovery system to operate." The supreme court re-
iterated the basic proposition that where the defendant is misled as
to the strength of the state's case and suffers prejudice as a result
of improper discovery conduct reversible error results." In this
case, however, the court found no prejudice to the defendant con-
sidering the absence of any intent to deceive the accused, the photo-
graphs were not, themselves prejudicial, and the judge acted prop-
erly with reference to the knife. The court closed its consideration
of this matter with a warning:
We certainly do not condone the trickery that can evolve from
the misuse of the discovery motions and answers. The penalties
of C. Cr P. Art. 729.5 are readily at hand for the trial judge to
employ! as was done in this case. If they are not used, and the
situation warrants, this Court will not hesitate to reverse.
In Sthte v. Meshell" the court was presented with such a case.
The defendant filed a proper motion for discovery prior to trial re-
questing a copy of any record of his arrest and conviction." The
state filed an answer indicating that it had none; however, the assis-
tant district attorney discovered the defendant's rap sheet in the
file the day prior to trial revealing that the accused previously had
been convicted of child abuse. This information first was disclosed to
36. LA CODE CalM. P. art 729.5 states:
A. If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the at-
tention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this Chapter or with an
order issued pursuant to this Chapter, the court may order such party to permit
the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, order a mistrial on motion of the
defendant, prohibit the party from introducing into evidence the subject matter
not disclosed, or enter such other order, other than dismissal, as may be ap-
propriate.
B. In addition to the sanctions authorized in Part A hereof, if at any time
prior or subsequent to final disposition the court finds that either the state
through the district attorney or assistant district attorney or the defendant or his
counsel has willfully failed to comply with this Chapter or with an order issued
pursuant to this Chapter, such failure shall be deemed to be a constructive con-
tempt of court.
37. State v. Hatter, 350 So. 2d 149 (La. 1977).
38. 392 So. 2d 433 (La. 1980).
39. LA. CODE CalM. P. art. 717 requires the district attorney to furnish a copy of
the defendant's rap sheet (a copy of any record of his criminal arrests and convictions)
upon proper request.
19821
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the defendant after the state had rested its case on a charge of
cruelty to a juvenile. However, article 729.3 imposes a continuing
duty at any time to advise promptly both the other party and the
court of the availability of information previously requested." The
trial judge denied the defendant's motion for a mistrial on the
grounds that "the state afforded that information at the first oppor-
tunity after it discovered its existence."" Acting in full support of
its language in Statur, the supreme court had no difficulty in find-
ing this conduct a substantial violation of the defendant's right to
prepare a defense and the action of the trial judge a reversible
abuse of discretion. In a well-considered analysis of the difficult posi-
tion in which withholding of such potentially damaging impeaching
material places defense counsel, Justice Marcus makes it clear that
discovery in criminal cases many times dictates the future course of
the trial-or lack of trial. Discovery is designed to work outside of
court, which requires fair and honest use of the devices by all par-
ticipants. The sanctions must be used in those rare situations where
willful disregard'" or carelessness produce a misuse of the discovery
provisions and the trial judge must accept the responsibility of en-
forcement. The reversal in Meshell is certainly not the most effi-
cient or effective method of correcting the problem caused by one
prosecutor who will not be affected directly. The cost to the public
is great. One is left to speculate as to what effect a different and
correct answer to the discovery motion might have had on the trial
strategy of defense counsel in Statur.
JURY
In State v. Jones'" the defendant was charged in one bill of infor-
mation with negligent injuring" and a separate count of resisting ar-
rest. 5 The defendant demanded a jury trial, but on the day of trial
the state's motion to sever the two counts was grarited and the
defendant was convicted on the negligent injuring charge after a
40. LA. CoDE CRIM. P. art. 729.3 states:
If, subsequent to compliance with an order issued pursuant to this Chapter and
prior to or during trial, a party discovers additional evidence or decides to use ad-
ditional evidence and such evidence is or may be, subject to discovery or inspec-
tion under the order issued, he shall promptly notify the other party and the
court of the existence of the additional evidence, so that the court may modify its
previous order or allow the other party to make an appropriate motion for addi-
tional discovery or inspection.
41. 392 So. 2d at 434.
42. See LA. CODE CalM. P. art. 729.5(B).
43. 396 So. 2d 1272 (La. 1981).
44. LA. R.S. 14:39 (1950 & Supp. 1978).
45. LA. R.S. 14:108 (1950).
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bench trial. Subsequently, the defendant entered a conditional guilty
plea to the resisting arrest charge. The law is settled that an accused
has a right to a jury trial if two or more petty offenses are joined so
that the aggregate punishment to which the defendant is exposed
exceeds the level of six months imprisonment or fines totaling five
hundred dollars." The maximum penalty to which the defendant was
exposed under this bill of information was one year imprisonment
and a fine of $1,000, thus giving him a right to a jury trial. The ques-
tion presented to the supreme court was whether the prosecutor
could, in effect, cancel this right by severing the counts for trial
since individually neither count warranted a jury trial. Under article
495.1 the court may sever for trial if prejudice results to either party
as a result of the joinder."7 The court held that prejudice in this con-
text meant detriment to one's legal rights or claims and that mere
inconvenience or loss of strategy advantage as a result of a jury
trial does not qualify. Here, the prosecutor could show no prejudice
and was seeking to sever only to avoid the delay and cost involved
in trying these minor charges to a jury. This reason was held not to
be sufficient. As the court put it: "Depriving a defendant of a right
to jury trial is not a legitimate prosecutorial end." 8 To this author
this result is unrealistic. The defendant was entitled to a jury trial
only by virtue of an accident of joinder-he was not entitled to it
and could not reasonably expect it. This trial situation probably
arose only because a plea bargain fell apart. To allow the severance
would place the defendant in no worse position than if charged
originally in separate bills of information. This decision simply says
to the prosecutor that he should charge each petty offense in a
separate bill of information.
The court was also faced this term with the question whether a
defendant who knowingly and intelligently has waived his right to a
jury trial may later have this right reinstated. State v. Cantanese,5
holds that where a defendant moves to reinstate his right sufficiently
in advance of trial so that reinstatement of the right to jury trial
will not interfere with the orderly administration of the business of
the court, result in undue delay or inconvenience to witnesses, or
prejudice the legitimate interests of the prosecution, the trial court
46. State v. Nettleton, 367 So. 2d 755 (La. 1979). LA. CODE CalM. P. art. 779(A)
provides:
A defendant charged with a misdemeanor in which the punishment may be a
fine in excess of five hundred dollars or imprisonment for more than six months
shall be tried by a jury of six jurors, all of whom must concur to render a verdict.
47. LA. CODE CalM. P. art 495.1 (added in 1975).
48. 396 So. 2d at 1275.
49. 385 So. 2d 235 (La. 1980).
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should exercise its discretion in favor of allowing trial by jury."
This solution to a problem that can result from many causes, such as
change in trial counsel, seems excellent and well considered.
The court emphasized once again the proper method of alleging
that the petit jury was improperly drawn. In State v. Ramos,'
Justice Dennis pointed out that errors regarding the improper selec-
tion of the petit jury venire cannot be raised by a motion in arrest
of judgment nor for the first time upon appeal. If such errors are to
be considered by the supreme court they must be raised by a proper
and timely motion to quash.2
The Louisiana Constitution provides that one accused shall have
a right to "full voir dire examination" of prospective jurors." This
has been interpreted to mean the right to make sufficient inquiry to
enable him to show grounds for challenges for cause and also to
discover information which will enable the defendant to exercise in-
telligently his peremptory challenges." May the trial judge grant a
prosecution challenge for cause without giving defense counsel an
opportunity to question the prospective juror for the purpose of
rehabilitation? In State v. Claiborne5" the supreme court answered
"no," that examination of the prospective juror by counsel might
result in convincing the trial judge that the person could render a
fair and impartial verdict. Justice Blanche concurred and despite his
doubts as to any prejudice to the defendant believed that the trial
judge should have "indulged" counsel. Justice Marcus in dissent
rested simply on the discretion possessed by the trial judge, as did
the other two dissenters.57 The court here seems to be concerned
primarily with making the so-called doctrine of rehabilitation
available to defendants because the court has in the past permitted
the doctrine to be used in favor of prosecutors." This concern is, of
course, not a very good reason. If the trial judge actually has "much
discretion" in ruling on challenges for cause, the process should end
with the decision of the court. Unless this examination process is to
become even more of a burden and cause of delay than it is now, the
50. Id. at 237. See also LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 780, comment (d).
51. 390 So. 2d 1262 (La. 1980).
52. Id at 1263. State v. Collins, 359 So. 2d 174 (La. 1979). See also LA. CODE CraM.
P. art. 532(9).
53. LA. CONST. art. I, § 17.
54. See generally LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 797.
55. See generally State v. Boen, 362 So. 2d 519 (La. 1978). LA. CODE CRIM. P. art.
799.
56. 397 So. 2d 486 (La. 1981).
57. Ad hoe Judges Covington and Chiasson dissented.
58. 397 So. 2d at 489.
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process must end somewhere, and this author submits that the point
of conclusion can best-if not only-be determined by the trial
judge. At some point, after being the center of prolonged hostile ex-
posure almost any prospective juror will say what he thinks the
questioner wants to know-just to end the interrogation. This state-
ment is particularly true when the trial judge takes an active role in
the process. Such a result is much more than the constitution, good
judgment or common sense requires. Rehabilitation should be disap-
proved for both defense and prosecution."'
PRESENCE OF THE DEFENDANT
The problem of the disruptive defendant came before the
supreme court in two cases during this term and in both cases the
discretion exercised by the trial judge was approved. The Supreme
Court of the United States has approved three methods for dealing
with the obstreperous defendant: (1) bind and gag him and allow him
to remain in the courtroom; (2) cite the person for contempt of court
and allow him to remain in the courtroom; or (3) remove the person
from the courtroom until he promises to conduct himself properly."0
In State v. Rochon," the accused, after repeated warnings to remain
seated quietly and a citation for contempt, disrobed in front of the
jury. Although he was removed from the courtroom, a sound system
was set up so that he could hefr the trial proceedings and co-counsel
sat with him throughout. In State v. Lee, 2 the accused repeatedly
interrupted proceedings by singing the Star Spangled Banner, re-
citing scripture and otherwise. After reprimand and warnings he too
was removed to an outer-room where he was provided with sound
and the services of an attorney. Clearly the trial judges acted prop-
erly in each of these cases. The fact that the defendant has a right
to be present at his trial"' grants him no right to disrupt the orderly
proceedings of the court, and when disruption occurs the conse-
quences are chargeable solely to him. 4 Trial courts have been very
fair, in the author's opinion, in applying sanctions to recalcitrant
defendants. The key is in first warning the disruptive person of the
consequences. A person facing a substantial sentence in a felony
case apparently is not deterred by a contempt citation, and the
reports indicate that most judges favor removal from the courtroom
59. See Sullivan. Developments in the Law, 1979-1980-Criminal Trial Procedure,
41 LA. L. REV. 582, 588-89 (1981).
60. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
61. 393 So. 2d 1224 (La. 1981).
62. 395 So. 2d 700 (La. 1981).
63. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 831-836.
64. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
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over binding and gagging the defendant because of the danger of ex-
treme prejudice of this method in a jury trial. This method has also
been approved by the supreme court, 5 but if adequate facilities are
available the removal solution seems preferable.
65. State v. Burnett, 337 So. 2d 1096 (La. 1976).
